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Abstract. The Information Artifact Ontology is an ontology in the do-
main of information entities. Core to the definition of what it is to be
an information entity is the claim that an information entity must be
‘about’ something, which is encoded in an axiom expressing that all
information entities are about some entity. This axiom comes into con-
flict with ontological realism, since many information entities seem to be
about non-existing entities, such as hypothetical molecules. We discuss
this problem in the context of diagrams of molecules, a kind of infor-
mation entity pervasively used throughout computational chemistry. We
then propose a solution that recognizes that information entities such as
diagrams are expressions of diagrammatic languages. In so doing, we not
only address the problem of classifying diagrams that seem to be about
non-existing entities but also allow a more sophisticated categorisation
of information entities.
Introduction
As the importance of ontology in biomedicine grows, the attention of ontologists
is being pressed to the tasks of disambiguation of domain terminology and clar-
ification of underlying hierarchies and relationships in an ever-wider network of
interrelated domains [2,10]. Some issues are emerging as similarly problematic
in many of these different domains. One such is the clear definition and distinc-
tion of foundational types such as processes and dispositions [1]. Another is the
confusion between information entities, such as computer simulations, models
and diagrams, and the entities that they are models and diagrams of. It is to
this latter problem that we turn in this paper.
Chemical graphs are the molecular models that are used throughout chem-
istry to succinctly describe chemical entities and allow for computational manip-
ulations [12,6]. Chemical graphs are typically depicted graphically as schematic
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illustrations – chemical diagrams. Chemical graphs and chemical diagrams are
examples of information entities in the chemical domain, and their use has be-
come so pervasive that language used by chemists to refer to chemicals regularly
interchanges words for information (such as ‘graph’) with words for actual chem-
icals [6].
The Information Artifact Ontology (IAO) [8] is an ontology being developed
for the domain of information entities of relevance in biomedicine. The funda-
mental criterion by which information entities are defined and categorised in
the IAO is their aboutness, that is, the types of entities that they are about. A
diagram illustrating the chemical structure of caffeine molecules, for example,
is about the class of caffeine molecules. While in this case the chemical dia-
gram corresponds to something in reality (caffeine molecules), there are many
other useful and scientifically relevant chemical diagrams that are not about
something that exists. Thus, these chemical graphs are not information entities
as currently defined in IAO. A similar scenario applies to many other models
used in biomedicine, for example pathway diagrams and the mathematical mod-
els used in quantitative systems biology. Using chemical diagrams as examples,
we will argue that information entities in IAO are defined too narrowly. Since
information entities may not necessarily be about something, they cannot be
categorized merely by what they are about. But, as we will argue, they should
rather be categorised by what sort of information entities they are in their own
right.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we briefly
describe the IAO and the theory of chemical graphs and their related diagrams.
Thereafter, we highlight the insufficiency of aboutness in defining types of di-
agrams. We go on to introduce some semantics for the representation relation-
ship between chemical diagrams and chemical entities; and finally, we propose a
modified approach to information ontology that is free of the problems with the
current approach.
1 Background
1.1 The Information Artifact Ontology
The Information Artifact Ontology (IAO) [8] is an ontology of information en-
tities being developed in the context of the Open Biological and Biomedical
Ontologies (OBO) Foundry [9], beneath the upper level ontology Basic Formal
Ontology (BFO) [11,5]. Within this context, information entities are defined as:
Definition 1. An information content entity ( ICE) is an entity that is generi-
cally dependent on some artifact and stands in the relation of aboutness to some
entity.
The generic dependence on an artifact (i.e., a human creation) in the above
definition restricts the scope of the domain to human-created information enti-
ties. The ‘generic’ part of the dependence captures the intuition that information
can be copied, that is, reproduced in multiple bearers, in a way that hair colour,
for example, cannot. The textual definition also refers to a relation of ‘aboutness’,
which is further supplemented by the axiom:
ICE subClassOf is about some Entity (1)
The above is given in the Manchester Web Ontology Language (OWL) syn-
tax, in which the existential quantification (∃) is expressed using the infix some
operator. This should not, however, obscure the strong existential dependency
claimed, namely: for every ICE, there exists some entity to which the ICE is
related by the is about relationship.
A hierarchical overview of the IAO together with some examples of informa-
tion content entities (ICE s) is illustrated in Figure 1.
Fig. 1. An overview of the Information Artifact Ontology
1.2 Chemical graphs and diagrams
The principal object of graph theory is a graph, which consists of a set of ob-
jects and the binary relations between them. Graph theory has found many
applications in chemistry and is used to represent molecular entities through the
molecular graph. These graphs represent the constitution of a molecule in terms
of nodes (usually atoms, but in some cases groups of atoms) and edges (chemical
bonds) [12].
For the purposes of this paper we define chemical graphs as follows6.
Definition 2. A chemical graph, denoted CG, is a tuple (V,E) in which each
vertex i ∈ V corresponds to an atom in a molecule; and each undirected edge
{i, j} ∈ E corresponds to a chemical bond between the atoms i and j.
These CGs are based on the valence bond model of quantum mechanics
[7]. For many of the molecules most relevant to the pharmaceutical industry
this model reasonably accurately represents (1) by atoms, those portions of the
molecules that chemists associate with particular atoms, and (2) by bonds, those
6 We ignore additional complexity such as the representation of stereochemistry.
portions of the molecules that have high electron probability density. Cheminfor-
matics software uses these to make useful predictions about the chemical prop-
erties of a molecule so represented and the physical properties of an ensemble of
those molecules. They also enable the schematic representation of molecules in
diagrams.
Definition 3. A chemical diagram, denoted CD, is a diagrammatic illustration
of the information encoded in a CG, which follows an agreed diagrammatic
syntax for the representation of the graph information.
Some examples of CDs are illustrated in Figure 2. In the 2D wireframe de-
piction, the diagrammatic syntax used specifies that the CD corresponds to the
CG in that, for each edge {i, j} ∈ E there is a corresponding line, and for each
vertex i ∈ V there is a corresponding corner or line ending in the CD. In the
3D ball and stick diagram, edges are illustrated with lines while vertices are
illustrated with coloured, labelled spheres. In the 3D spacefill diagram, vertices
are illustrated with large coloured spheres. Both the colours and the radii of the
sphere are arbitrary—atoms are much too small to have colours, but the radii
are based on experimental averages and are an approximation to the actual
molecular structure.
Notice that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between CDs and CGs,
since the same CG can be illustrated in many different CDs, obeying different
syntaxes.
Fig. 2. Some examples of CDs for the molecule caffeine
CDs, like maps, represent spatial information. Let us call spatial represen-
tations such as street maps, chemical diagrams, and engineering design models
structural diagrams and, to a first approximation, assume that they have a di-
rect structural association with a portion of reality, which they are intended to
represent.
Definition 4. A structural diagram ( SD) is a diagrammatic representation of
spatial aspects, such as position, topology and connection, of a structured portion
of reality.
This definition, however, does not suffice, for reasons that will be described
in the following section.
2 When ‘is about’ isn’t enough
The agreed syntax of CDs allows their informational content to be reliably un-
derstood by all members of the community who use them for exchange of such
information.
The agreed syntax also allows for the depiction of molecules, which are
1. Planned, in that the representation is used as a precursor to a synthesis
procedure expected to produce a corresponding molecule instance.
2. Hypothesised, in that the representation corresponds to a molecule class for
which it is not known whether corresponding instances exist.
3. Chemically infeasible, in that it is known that the representation illustrates a
class of molecules for which no instances can exist for a measurable duration
of time under normal conditions.
4. Impossible, in that the representation cannot be the structure of any molecule
instances, since it violates the rules of molecular compositionality.
In the first two cases the CD might or might not be about molecules that
exist. In the third case chemists expect, and in the fourth case they are certain
that, the aboutness criterion of the IAO is violated. Nevertheless, these CDs are
used by chemists to communicate and exchange information in the same ways as
CDs that are known to correspond to something in reality. Thus, the way CDs
are used does not justify treating only a subset of them as information entities.
It also indicates that Definition 4 is not along the right lines.
A conceptualist resolution to this issue might defend a view of ontology as
containing representations of concepts, and thereby not be required to differenti-
ate between chemical diagrams for real or impossible molecules, or differentiate
at the level of metadata only [4]. However, this seems to overlook the fundamen-
tal distinction between these cases, one that chemists recognise. Another strategy
for addressing this problem is provided by Ceusters and Smith [3] who distin-
guish between referring and non-referring representational units in the context
of a mental representation. The application of this distinction to an ontology of
SDs beneath IAO is illustrated in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. Referring and non-referring information entities in the IAO
One obvious problem with this approach is that it leads to a massive level of
parallel maintenance, since most types of ICE can appear twice in the ontology.
A more fundamental objection is that this approach violates the fundamental
design principles of BFO: categorization according to ontological nature, which
does not change. For example, it is impossible for a tree (an independent contin-
uant) to become a temporal region, or for a smile (a dependent continuant) to
become a soccer game (an occurrent). However, according to the approach in [3]
a CD might be a non-referring ICE now, but become a referring ICE tomorrow,
because somewhere in some lab somebody accidentally synthesized the corre-
sponding molecule. Thus, in contrast to the other ontological categories in BFO,
it would be possible for non-referring ICE s to change their ontological nature.
Even worse, the ontological nature of CDs would be affected by events that had
no causal connection to the CD and did not change its structure in any way.
Since the ontological nature of an entity is not affected by Cambridge changes,
that is to say changes only in its description, we conclude that ‘non-referring
ICE ’ and ‘referring ICE ’ are not true ontological categories.
In summary, we agree with Ceusters and Smith that non-referring ICE s are
ICE s. However, we reject the idea that the distinction between referring and
non-referring should be the primary basis for classifying ICE s. There are some
ICE s that are necessarily about something (e.g., photographs). But structural
diagrams are information entities in virtue of the fact that they are well-formed
expressions in a diagrammatic language. For each type of SD, there is a vocabu-
lary (the symbols and icons that are used in diagrams of that type), a grammar
that regulates how the elements of the vocabulary can be combined, and compo-
sitionality in the sense that the semantics of a complex expression is determined
by the semantics of its components and the way these components are arranged.
The elements of the vocabulary of the diagrammatic language do need to cor-
respond to something existing, otherwise the diagrams will not be scientifically
relevant. However, not all combinations of the vocabulary that are permissible
by the grammar will correspond to something in reality. It would seem strange
indeed, on giving an ontological account of natural language, to divide all sen-
tences into those that are about facts and those that are not. “Submariners love
periscopes.” is a declarative sentence with a transitive verb regardless of whether
it is a fact that submariners love periscopes. The same is true for expressions of
diagrammatic languages.
3 The ontology of structural diagrams
Different types of CD (such as 2D wireframe, 3D ball and stick) obey differ-
ent diagrammatic syntaxes. What is essential to distinguish different types of
diagrams is thus to provide a definition for these syntaxes.
Definition 5. A diagrammatic language LD = 〈V,G〉 is an ordered pair that
consists of the vocabulary V (a set of icons and symbols) and a syntax G of
composition rules.
Definition 6. An interpreted diagrammatic language is a quadruple ILD =
〈V,G, T, φ〉 such that 〈V,G〉 is a diagrammatic language, T is a set of types that
is partitioned set of independent continuants IT and dependent continuants DT ,
and φ is a function that maps the elements from V onto T .
Definition 7. Let ILD be an intepreted diagrammatic language as above, and let
D be a well-formed expression in LD (i.e., a diagram). D is a structural diagram
that is about an entity x iff there is some injective interpretation function ι such
that:
– for each element of V and each token t of V that is part of D, ι(t) is an
instance of φ(V )
– for two tokens t1, t2 that are part of D and ι(t1), ι(t2) are instances of
elements of IT : t1 is connected to t2 iff ι(t1) is connected to ι(t2)
– for all tokens t, t1, ... tn: if ι(t) is an instance of some element of DT and
t1 ... tn are all connected to t, then ι(t) inheres in ι(t1) ... ι(tn).
– there is no part y of x such that y is an instance of some type in T and for
all t that are part of D there is no ι(t) = y.
Chemical diagrams of hypothetical molecules that do not exist are not about
anything, but they are still well-formed expressions of an interpreted diagram-
matic language. For example, the vocabulary V of the 3D ball and stick language
consists of colored spheres and lines. The syntax G describes how these elements
can be combined to diagrams. The set IT consists of types of atoms, the set DP
consists of the types of chemical bonds that connect atoms within a molecule.
The function φ maps the color-coded balls to types of atoms and the links to
types of bonds. The second diagram in Figure 2 is a structural diagram of a
given instance of a caffeine molecule x, since it is possible to map the spheres
of the diagram to the atoms that are part of x and the links of the diagram to
the chemical bonds of x such that the connections in the diagrams corresponds
to the chemical reality in the molecule. Conversely, if the diagram contains a
link that does not correspond to a bond in a given molecule x or if it contains
a sphere that is mapped to a type of atoms that do not occur as part of x, then
the diagram does not represent x.7
To place SDs (and therefore CDs) as subtypes of IAO’s ICE, we need to
change the fundamental aboutness criterion from Equation (1) to a value rather
than existential restriction:
ICE subClassOf is about only Entity (2)
This restriction no longer expresses an existential dependence. Rather, it now
has the effect that if there is some entity that the ICE is about, then it must
be of the required type to avoid a logical inconsitency. Note that this formula
expresses a schema, which will be made more precise for different types of ICE.
With the inclusion of conforms to axioms to relate the ICE to the LD, we
are now in a position to provide a better definition for SDs and CDs to replace
Definition 4:
7 The second clause of definition 7 is irrelevant in the case of CDs, because in CDs
tokens of symbols for independent continuants (the atoms) are always connected by
tokens of symbols for dependent continuants (the bonds). However, definition 7 is also
intended to be applicable to diagrams where symbols for independent continuants
might be connected directly; for example architectural drawings and engineering
blueprints.
SD subClassOf ICE and is about only StructuredEntity
and conforms to some DiagrammaticLanguage
CD subClassOf SD and is about only MolecularEntity
We can safely include in the resulting ontology, illustrated in Figure 4, dia-
grams of planned, hypothetical, infeasible, and impossible molecules.
Fig. 4. The ontology of chemical diagrams with distinctions for different syntaxes
Now, we can define different types of chemical diagrams regardless of their
aboutness, and furthermore express the difference between different types of di-
agrams that are about the same entity (such as 2D and 3D diagrams of caffeine
molecules). However, we can go one step further and define a relationship be-
tween 2D and 3D depictions of the same molecule.
Definition 8. Let L1, L2 be two interpreted diagrammatic languages. Let Θ1 be
a non-empty set of all well-formed expressions of L1, such that there is at least
one diagram D in Θ1 and one entity x, such that D is about x in L1. Let Θ2 be
a non-empty set of all well-formed expressions of L2, such that there is at least
one diagram D in Θ2 and one entity x, such that D is about x in L2.
The function m is a coarsening from Θ1 (in L1) to Θ2 (in L2) iff
– m is a function from Θ1 onto Θ2; and
– for all diagrams D in Θ1 and all entities x: if D is about x in L1, then m(D)
is about x in L2; and
– for all diagrams D2 in Θ2 and all entities x: if D2 is about x in L2, then
there is a diagram D such that D is about x and m(D) = D2.
Coarsening functions map between two different diagrammatic languages,
such that if a diagram in one language represents an entity, then it is possible
to construct a diagram in the other language that also represents the entity.
Typically, coarsening functions are directed from a greater to a lesser level of
detail; that is, it is possible to map diagrams in a more detailed language to a
diagram in a coarser language, but not the reverse. Coarsening functions allow
us to define a relationship coarser than between SDs.
Definition 9. Let D1 and D2 be diagrams conforming to languages L1 and L2,
respectively. D2 is coarser than D1 iff
– there exists a function m and sets of diagrams Θ1, Θ2 of L1 and L2, re-
spectively, such that m is a coarsening from Θ1 (in L1) to Θ2 (in L2) and
m(D1) = D2; and
– there is no function m′ such that m′ is a coarsening from D2 (in L2) to D1
(in L1).
This is illustrated in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Some examples of chemical diagrams and their relationships
4 Conclusion
We have argued that the is about relationship is not enough to define CDs,
for two reasons. Firstly, given the possibility of having several different CDs
corresponding to the same molecule, we see that distinguishing between different
types of diagrams, which obey different representational syntaxes, is not possible
using only distinctions in what the diagram is about. Secondly, a challenge is
posed in that CDs may be used validly to illustrate classes of molecules for which
no instances exist. The existential dependency expressed in IAO means that the
IAO cannot, in its present form, allow for the inclusion of such non-referring
information entities.
We evaluated an approach based on parallel maintenance of IAO hierarchies
with differing is about commitment. While such parallel maintenance may be
a scientifically-valid strategy in some scenarios, it is unable to express the fact
that the same representational formalism (i.e., diagrammatic syntax) is used
across the hierarchies. Of course, the diagrammatic syntax, if it is to be scien-
tifically valid, must typically represent entities which do exist. But the syntax
allows for compositionality and it would be absurd to require the existence of
instances for all the complex expressions obtained by composing the elements of
the representational vocabulary.
We therefore propose the definition of structural diagrams such as chemi-
cal diagrams based on their syntaxes. Any diagram expressed in an interpreted
diagrammatic syntax is a valid information content entity regardless of the exis-
tence of instances that the diagram is about; although the existence of such an
instance may be an interesting property depending on the application scenario.
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